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Thefederal public housing program had its origin in the United States
Housing Act of 1937. At present there are more than one million public
housing units occupied by more than three million people. Despite the
age and size of this program, there are no published estimates of its effect
on consumption patterns. Henry Aaron, Robert Bish, and Eugene
Smolensky and J. Douglas Gomery have measured the benefit to a family
in public housing as the difference between the market rent of its dwelling
and the rent paid by the family and have made rough estimates of market
rent in order to determine the distribution of direct benefits from the
program. The primary purposes of this paper are to estimate the effect of
the federal public housing program on the consumption patterns of its
occupants and to determine the distribution of direct benefits from this
NOTE:The data underlying this study were collected in 1973 for the Department of Housing and
Urban Development Housing Policy Review Task Force. We are grateful to the many people involved in
their collection. The results reported here differ somewhat from those in the task force report because
additional time has allowed us to make some improvements. We are also grateful to Michael Murray and
participants in a seminar at the University of Michigan for critical comments and to Yacouby
and Robert Berry for computational assistance.
51program. These estimates are produced within the framework of a simple
general equilibrium model and are based on a sample of 333 families who
lived in public housing and 168 families who lived in private housing in
Boston, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Francisco, and in 1972.
I.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Assumethat there are two goods, housing service and nonhousing goods,
and that the markets for these goods are perfectly competitive and in
long-run equilibrium. Assume that the long-run supply curves in both
markets are perfectly elastic.1 These assumptions imply that the market
prices of the two goods are unaffected by the public housing program.
Before proceeding, it is desirable to define the phrase housing service
with some care. Housing service is a good provided in some unobservable
quantity by each dwelling unit during each period of time. It is the one and
only thing in a dwelling unit to which consumers attach value. More
concretely, the quantity of housing service provided by a dwelling unit
can be thought of as an index of all its attributes. If the private housing
market is perfectly competitive, then in long-run equilibrium, each unit of
housing service sold in one market sells for the same price. Hence, if we
observe one apartment renting for $200 per month and another for $100
per month in the same market, then we say that the first apartment
provides twice the quantity of housing service per time period that the
second does.
Now let us use the assumptions made to derive formulas for calculating
the effect of public housing on the consumption patterns of its occupants
and the value of this program to these families. Figure 1 contains several
indifference curves of one family living in public housing. In the absence
of the program, this family would have some income Y and could buy as
much of each good as it could pay for at pricesand Pg'. It would select
some combination ofthe two goods. Under the public housing
program, the family has been offered and has accepted a particular
dwelling unit providing some quantity of housing serviceInorder to
occupy this dwelling, the family must pay a certain rent per time
period. After paying this rent, the family has enough money left to buy
units of nonhousing goods. It is important to recognize that public
housing does not change an eligible family's situation by rotating its
budget line. In the two-good case, it simply adds one point to the family's
budget space. Since the public housing authority could offer a family a
dwelling worse than it would otherwise occupy (i.e.,< and charge
a rent such that the family is able to increase its nonhousing consumption
52 Kraft and Olsenby more than enough to compensate for its decrease in housing consump-
tion, the basic assumptions of the theory of consumer choice, together
with the possible changes in budget spaces under the public housing
program, do not imply that public housing tenants consume more housing
service than they would in the absence of the program.
In the case depicted in Figure 1, the family consumes
1The Effect of Public Housing on a
Family's Consumption Pattern and
Well-Being
on
NOTE:Y is the familys income, P7' and are the market prices per unit of
housing service and nonhousing goods. og' and are the quantities of
housing service and nonhousing goods consumed by the family in the
absence of the public housing program, andare the quantities of
housing service and nonhousing goods consumed by the family under the
program. B is the value of the program to the family, S is the difference
between the market value of the goods consumed by the family under the
program and the family's income andare the quantities of housing
service and nonhousing goods that the family would consume were it given
an unrestricted cash grant equal to S instead of its eligibility for public
housing.







morehousing service than it would have consumed in the absence of the
public housing program. In addition the family spends
(
lesson housing. As a result, it consumes a greater quantity of nonhousing
goods. To be precise, it consumes
percent
more nonhousing goods. Since there are only two goods, everything that




Theproportional change in the total quantities of housing service and
nonhousing goods for a set of families living in different cities can be
calculated by formulas 1 and 2 where the subscript i indicates the ith
family and the subscript jindicatesthe jth city. We write each formula in
two ways to point out that our quantity indexes are arrived at by dividing












Noticethat these formulas incorporate an implication of our assumptions
that all markets are perfectly competitive and in long-run equilibrium,
namely, that within each city all consumers pay the same price per unit of
housing service and the same price per unit of nonhousing goods.
However, it is not presumed that either price is the same in all cities.
There is some unrestricted cash grant B which, if given to this family in
place of its eligibility for public housing, would make the family as well off
as it is under the public housing program. This is what we mean by the
benefit (or value) of the program to the family. Obviously, the value of the
program to this family depends on its indifference map. In order to
estimate the benefits of the program to families living in public housing,
Kraftand Olsenwe assume that all such families have a utility function of the form
(3)
For a family having this utility function, Joseph De Salvo2 has shown that
(4) B = —
aset of families occupying public housing is obtained
by computing the benefit to each family and calculating the mean of these
numbers. Mean benefit cannot be obtained by substituting the mean
values of a, Y, and into (4).
Under the assumptions made in this section, the effect of the program
on aggregate consumption of housing service and nonhousing goods by
the public housing tenants in our sample and the benefit to each family
can be calculated from a knowledge of each family's income, its expendi-
ture on housing under the public housing program and in its absence, the
market rent of its public housing unit, the parameter of its indifference
map, and the differences in the market prices of housing service and
nonhousing goods in different cities. We know the income of, and the rent
paid by, a sample of public housing tenants. The U.S. Department of
Labor produces cross-sectional indexes of housing and nonhousing
prices. We must predict how much each family would spend on housing in
the absence of the program, the parameter of its indifference map, and
the market rent of its public housing unit.
II.PREDICTION OF THE PARAMETER OF A FAMILY'S
INDIFFERENCE MAP AND ITS HOUSING EXPENDITURE
IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM
The"parameter" a is simply the proportion of income spent on housing
by a consumer with the preferences (3) facing the budget constraint
PhQ,, = V
We assume that a depends in part on certain family characteristics but is
not identical for all families which are the same with respect to these
characteristics. Specifically, we assume
(5) a = b0+ b ,R + b2S+b3N+b4A +u
whereR = 1 if the head of household is nonwhite and 0 if white, S = 1 if
the head of the household is female and 0 if male, N = number of persons
in the household, A = age of the head of the household, and u = a random
TheDistribution of Benefits from Public Housing 55
-variable with mean zero and variance independent of these family
characteristics.3 Therefore, the best linear unbiased predictor of a for
a family selected at random is
where the g's are the least-squares estimators of the b's in (5), based on a
sample of families who buy both goods in the private market.
We had data on the housing expenditure, income, number of persons,
and the age, race, and sex of the head of 168 households living in Boston,
St. Louis, San Francisco, and Washington just prior to their admission to
public housing. These data were used to estimate a relationship of the
form (5) for each city separately and for allcities combined. The
TABLE1Estimated Relationships between Rent—Income
Ratio and Family Characteristics






























































income ratio .35 .34 .35 .39 .36
Number of
observations 40 48 40 40 168
R2 (adjusted) .26 .14 —.08 .22 .10
Standard error .15 .17 .19 .14 .17estimated coefficients, t-scores, and other statistics are reported in Table
1. We also had data on the characteristics of 333 families living in public
housing in these four cities and Pittsburgh. The characteristics of the
public housing tenants living in Boston, St. Louis, San Francisco, and
Washington were substituted into the equations for these cities to predict
the proportions of their incomes that they would devote to housing in the
absence of the public housing program. Since we had no data on families
living in private housing in Pittsburgh, we used the relationship based on
data from all four cities to make predictions for public housing tenants in
this city.
Each family's predicted rent-income ratio was multiplied by its income
to predict how much the family would have spent on housing in the
absence of the program.
III.PREDICTION OF THE MARKET RENT OF A
PUBLIC HOUSING UNIT
RobertGillingham has estimated relationships between market rent and
housing characteristics in each of the five cities, using data for The
housing characteristics included were age of structure; number of rooms;
number of bathrooms; condition of unit; inclusion in rent of furnishings,
refrigerator, air conditioning, and stove; the presence of hot running
water, central heat, covered parking, and elevator; number of persons in
unit; and race of the head of the household. We tried to obtain data on
these characteristics for the 333 public housing units in our sample. There
were some gaps in the data. Most importantly, year built was not reported
for the 120 leased existing units in the sample. We assumed that the age of
each of these units was equal to the median age of private housing in the
same city. In all, somewhat less than 5percentof the desired information
was missing and was filled in with well-educated guesses. The information
on the characteristics of the public housing units in the sample was
substituted into Gillingham's equations to predict the market rents of
these units in1960. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) time-series
housing price indexes were used th adjust these predictions to 1972.
IV.EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Weknow the income of, and the rent paid by, a sample of 333 families
living in public housing. There are cross-sectional indexes of housing and
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housing expenditure in the absence of the program, and the market rent
of its public housing unit have been predicted. The sample means of
PZ'QZ', and Y are $74, $132, $148, and $450 per month.
The sample mean of a is .32.
Using equations 1 and 2, we estimate that public housing tenants in this
sample consumed 11 percent more housing service and 18 percent more
nonhousing goods than they would have consumed in the absence of this
program.5 Of course, different families experienced different percentage
changes in their consumption of the two goods. Indeed, we estimate that
33 percent of these families occupied worse housing and 9 percent spent
less on other goods.
The usual arguments for housing subsidies imply that the attainment of
an efficient allocation of resources, preferred by everyone, to the
allocation in the absence of subsidies requires that recipients consume
more housing service and less nonhousing goods than they would
consume were they allowed to choose any combination of goods with the
same market value as the combination consumed under the housing
subsidy program. Therefore, it is important to compare and in
Figure 1. Table 2 presents the distribution of the variable
— = —
for the families in this sample. We estimate that public housing is more
stimulative of housing consumption than cash grants for a bare majority
(54 percent) of these families. Therefore, the effect of public housing on
consumption patterns appears to be inconsistent with the rationale of this
program for a substantial minority of its direct beneficiaries.
Formula 4 was used to estimate the value of the public housing
program to each family in the sample. The mean of these numbers is $54
per month.6 Had each of these families been allowed to consume any
combination of goods with the same market value as the combination that
it consumed under the program, the mean benefit would have been $74
per month.7 The difference is a manifestation of the tremendous distor-
tions in consumption patterns under the program from the viewpoint of
public housing tenants. These distortions are evident in Table 2.
If there had been no cost of administering the public housing program
and no inefficiency in producing housing service under the program, then
$74 would have been the mean cost incurred by taxpayers on behalf of the
families in this sample. All existing estimates (Smolensky 1968, pp.
94—101; Olsen 1968, pp. 69—78; Muth 1973, pp. 7—20; Kraft and Olsen
1973, pp. 11—38) suggest that it costs more than a dollar to produce a
dollar's worth of housing service under the conventional and turnkey
variants of public housing. Therefore, even if the cost of administering a
58 Kraft and Olsen
ATABLE 2Distribution of Deviations
of Housing Consumption





Percentage Deviations Families in Sample
Less than 6.6
—49 to —40—49 6.0
—39 to —30 6.6




10 to 19 8.7
20to29 6.9
30 to 39 7.8
40 to 49 6.3
More than 49 12.3
program of unrestricted cash grants was as great as the cost of administer-
ing the public housing program, the mean cost incurred by taxpayers on
behalf of the families in this sample was probably greater than $74 per
month. By giving these families unrestricted cash grants, it would have
been possible to induce each family to consume a combination of goods
that it considered to be as satisfactory as the combination consumed
under the public housing program, while reducing the cost to taxpayers by
at least 27 percent.
The preceding results are not based on a random sample from the
population of families in public housing. Furthermore, the characteristics
of the families in this sample differ significantly from the characteristics of
all public housing families. Some of these differences are reported in
Table 3.
In order to get better estimates of mean tenant benefit and propor-
tional changes in consumption of housing service and nonhousing goods
for the entire program, we regressed each of these variables on family
characteristics, using data in the sample, and substituted the mean
characteristics ofall public housing families into these estimated
TheDistribution of Benefits from Public Housing
(59TABLE 3Comparison of Characteristics of all Public Housing
Families with Public Housing Families in Sample
Characteristics Sample Universe
Mean monthly income $450 $289
Mean number of persons 4.8 3.3
Mean age of head of household 39 49
Percentage of households headed by nonwhite 86 60
Percentage of households headed by female 60 72
1
SOURCE: The mean age of head of household for the entire population of households in public
housing was estimated from the age distributions in Tables 108 and 113 of the 1971
HUD Statistical Abstract. The other means and percentages for the universe of
households in public housing were estimated by Susan Kete of the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development.
relationships.8 In effect, we argue that, although the characteristics of the
families in the sample differ significantly from the characteristics of all
families in public housing, the relationships between the variables of
interest and family characteristics in the sample are good estimates of the
relationships for the population.9 The estimated coefficients, t scores, and
other statistics are reported in Table 4. Substituting the mean characteris-
tics of all families in public housing into the first two equations yields
estimates of 33 and 14 percent for the changes in aggregate consumption
of housing service and nonhousing goods. This compares with estimates
of 11 and 18 percent based on the sample alone. These estimates lead us
to believe that the increase in aggregate consumption of housing service is
greater for all families in public housing than for the families in our
sample and that the program distorts consumption towards housing for
substantially more than 54percentof all public-housing tenants. Sub-
stituting the mean characteristics of all families in public housing into the
third equation leads us to conclude that mean tenant benefit for the
4
entireprogram is $81 per month.
An estimated relationship between net tenant benefit and family
characteristics is also useful for analyzing the distribution of benefits








The numbers in parentheses are t scores.
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ASince we were able to reject at the 5percentlevel of significance the
hypothesis that the coefficients of the squared terms are all zero, we
conclude that there are nonlinearities in the relationship between mean
tenant benefit and family characteristics. Equation 6 indicates that mean
benefit varies inversely with income and directly with family size for
families of less than nine persons. We can be moderately confident that
households headed by females receive smaller benefits than households
headed by males and that nonwhite households receive smaller benefits
than white households. The hypothesis that net tenant benefit varies with
the age of the head of the household can be rejected at the 5percentlevel
of significance. Table 5 shows that if we do not hold constant other
characteristics, mean benefit increases with income at the lowest income
levels and decreases with income at higher levels.
TABLE4Regressions of Weighted Proportional
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Mean of regressand .11 .18 54
Number of observations 333 333 333
R2 (adjusted) .67 .57 50
Standard error .35 .12 .57
NOTE:r-statistics are in parentheses.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Not only does mean benefit vary inversely wit1h income among families
living in public housing, after taking account of the effects of other
characteristics, but also such families are on the average poorer than
those not served by the program. In 1972, the median annual income of
all families in the United States was more than $10,000, whereas it was
less than $3,000 for families in public housing.
Behind these measures of central tendency lie some disturbing var-
iances which reflect unfavorably upon the equity of the public housing
program. The estimate of the standard deviation of the error term in
regression 6 suggests that we should expect roughly one-third of a set of
families that are the same with respect to the five characteristics included
in the regression to receive benefits deviating from the mean by at least
$56permonth. This enormous variance in benefits to similarly situated
families in public housing can also be seen in colunm 4 of Table 5.Inpart,
these differences in benefits are due to the great variance in the
desirability of different public housing units. Among families that are the
same with respect to the five characteristics, some occupy new units in
excellent condition while others live in deteriorating older units.
As important as the large variance in benefits to similarly situated
families who get into public housing is the fact that most families at the
lowest income levels receive no benefits. Indeed, most of the neediest
families are not served, while many less needy families are served. Table 5
indicatesthat about 50 percent of the families in public housing have
annual incomes in excess of $3,000, while 95 percent of all families in the
United States with annual incomes less than $3,000 are not served by the
program.
Combining data in columns 3 through 7, we are able to estimate the
mean and standard deviation of benefits to all households in each income
class. This mean benefit first rises and then falls with income. While these
standard deviations are smaller than the standard deviations of benefits
among families who get into public housing, the coefficients of variation
are much larger.
NOTES
1.This assumption is consistent with the finding of Richard Muth (1960, pp. 42-46), but
Frank de Leeuw and Nkanta Ekanem find price elasticities of long-run supply between
0.3 and 0.7.
2.The Cobb-Douglas indifference map is appealing because it yields an explicit formula
for calculating benefits. Other widely used indifference maps do not yield such a
formula. In these cases, it is necessary to solve a different nonlinear programming
problem for each family in order to estimate its benefit. The Cobb-Douglas indifference
map is roughly consistent with empirical evidence on the demand for housing service
which suggests that the price elasticity of demand is approximately equal to minus one
and the permanent-income elasticity is about equal to one, Unfortunately, our data
TheDistribution of Benefits from Public Housing 63include current income but do not contain a good proxy for permanent income, and
estimates of thecurrent-incomeelasticity are substantially less than one. In order to test
our specification (3), we estimated the parameters of a displaced Cobb-Douglas
indifference map,
U= —bh)"(Q,,
of which equation 3 is a special case. We rejected at the 5 percent level of signifidance
the hypothesis that both displacement parameters are zero. Michael Murray has
estimated the parameters of a generalized Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
indifference map using current income. The Cobb-Douglas indifference map is also a
special case of the generalized CES. Murray rejected at the 5 percent level of
significance the Cobb-Douglas specification. Clearly, we have sacrificed accuracy for
simplicity in estimating benefits.
3.We tested for nonlinearities by estimating a relationship including age of head of
household and number of persons squared. For all four cities we could not reject at the 5
percent level of significance the hypothesis that the coefficients of these two variables
are both equal to zero.
4.It should be noted that the coefficients of determination range in value from 0.55 to
0.75. The regressand in these regressions is the natural logarithm of gross rent, and data
on individual dwelling units are used.
5.In response to Henry Aaron's closing remark, it should be noted that the accuracy of
these estimates depends on the accuracy with which the meanhousingexpenditure in
the absence of the program and the meanmarketrent have been estimated. This
depends upon, but is not the same thing as, the accuracy with which the housing
expenditures of individual families and the market rents of individual dwellings can be
predicted. With 333 observations, the means can be estimated with much greater
accuracy than the values for individuals.
6.It is common to use aggregate data to estimate the mean benefit of a government
program to a set of families. Substituting the sample means of a, and Y
into formula 4 yields $72 per month. Obviously, the results of this procedure can be
very misleading.
7.The most frequently used measure of the benefit of a government program to a family is
the excess of the market value of the goods consumed under the program over the
market value of the goods that would have been consumed in its absence. Seventy-four
dollars is the mean of these differences for our sample. Since this measure assumes that
an individual is indifferent between all combifiations of goods with the same market
value, it is clearly cruder than the measure used in this paper which only assumes that an
individual is indifferent between all dwelling units with the same market value.
8. The proportional changes in aggregate consumption of housing service and nonhousing
goods are equal to the means of the weighted proportional changes for individual
families, where the weights are the ratio of each family's consumption of the good to
mean consumption. That is
H
These weighted proportional changes in consumption are the dependent variables in Th
the regressions reported in Table 4. Substituting the mean characteristics of the
households in our sample into these estimated relationships yields the estimates of the
proportional changes in aggregate consumption already reported.
9. Two possibly important objections to this assumption are that the rent schedules and
the age and, hence, quality distributions of public housing units are likely to be different
between local housing authorities in the sample and other local housing authorities.
64 Kraft and Olsen
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COMMENTS
Henry Aaron
The Brookings Institution and University of Maryland
Economists have long argued that subsidies should be provided in cash rather
than in kind if the objective is to maximize the increase in the recipients
NOTE:The views expressed are those of the author, arid not necessarily those of the officers, trustees.
or other staff members of the Brookings Institution or the University of Maryland.
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well-being. As a number of authors have recently pointed out, this conclusion
does not follow if those who are paying for the subsidy care about the items
which the recipient consumes as well as (or instead of) his general well-being.
Others have argued that society may be a better custodian of the rights of
children than are parents, and that restriction of subsidies to items consumed
jointly by the household (e.g., housing) or that bulk larger in the utility functions of
children than in those of adults (e.g., food) may be warranted. Still others have
held that the decision about which goods should be allocated through the
market, which through other means, and which through some combination is
itself a political judgment, in the making of v*hich no automatic presumption in
favor of market allocationis warranted. Indeed, Schmundt, Stieffel, and
Smolensky have shown that if consideration is accorded to opinions about the
consumption mix of beneficiaries held by persons other than the recipient, then
transfers that do not distort consumption (i.e., unrestricted income transfers)
are, in general, suboptimal.
However these issues are resolved, itis important to know how much
particular subsidies do distort consumption choices of recipients. In such
calculations, it is necessary, in principle, to take account of all other subsidies in
measuring distortions, although in practice this counsel of perfection is usually
ignored.
The paper by John Kraft and Edgar Olsen is an important step in the effort to
estimate the inefficiencies of in-kind subsidies viewed solely in terms of the
tastes of recipients. This paper grew out of evaluations performed within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development to determine whether federal
housing subsidies should be extended, revised, or abolished. Kraft and Olsen
proceed by noting that public housing enlarges the choice set of recipients by
one point. Access to public housing enables recipients to buy a certain quantity
of housing at a subsidized price. In principle, this quantity of housing may be
greater or less than the recipient would consume, and the rent charged may be
greater or less than recipients would pay, in the absence of public housing. All
that is required for the tenant to accept public housing is that he enjoy increased
utility from the quantity of public housing and the quantity of other goods that can
be purchased after the subsidized rent has been paid.
To clarify what Kraft and Olsen have done, consider the following simple
identities
C = total cost of supplying public housing
—N = inefticiencies of supplying public housing (may be positive or negative)
M = market value of public housing
—S = subsidy to tenants
F? = rent paid by tenants
Clearly the net financial cost of public housing to various governments is N+ S.
but the welfare cost of public housing is less to the extent that S improves tenant
utility. Some unrestricted cash transfer, T, would put the potential public housing
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Atenant on the same indifference surface as does public housing. If S— T= Z
measures the consumption inefficiency of public housing, N+Zmeasures its
welfare cost. Kraft and Olsen measure Z. They ignore N, which was treated in
other HUD studies.
Kraft and Olsen computed M by modifying and applying hedonic price indexes
(estimated by Robert Gillingham) to the physical characteristics of 333 public
housing units. Given A from public housing records, S then is a residual. To
calculate Z Tmust be estimated, which requires that Kraft and Olsen obtain the
household's utility function.
They do so by assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility function of two goods, housing
and other goods. The exponent of housing in this function is also its budget
share. Kraft and Olsen estimate the proportion of income public-housing tenants
would spend on housing if they rented on the unsubsidized market from a
regression of this share on race, sex, and age of household head, and household
size of a sample of low-income households from whom data were collected just
before their admission to public housing in Boston, St. Louis, San Francisco, and
Washington. These functions are used to calculate how much residents of public
housing with various characteristics would spend on housing if they did not live
in public housing. Given this share, the Cobb-Douglas utility function is specified
(since the budget share of housing equals its exponent). Itis then easy to
calculate the unrestricted transfer Tthat would be just as attractive as access to
public housing. Kraft and Olsen estimate that S= $74, T= $54, and that
therefore the consumption inefficiency of public housing, Z was about 27
percent among sampled households.
Kraft and Olsen next regress the estimated change in housing and other
consumption and estimated net benefit of sampled households on various
household characteristics. Based on mean values of these characteristics for all
public-housing tenants, they conclude that the distortion of consumption is
considerably greater for all households than for sampled households.
Kraft and Olsen also estimate that net tenant benefit Tfirst rises then falls with
tenant income, presumably because the distortive effects of public housing are
greater and, hence, the additions to utility are smaller as incomes tend toward
zero. As incomes rise beyond a certain point, so do rents, thus reducing net
benefits.
Finally, they observe that these inefficiencies do not occur so much because
public housing on the average increases housing consumption more than
consumption if the government gives S in cash, but rather because some
households are forced to consume too much and some to consume too little. In
fact, public housing induces a bare majority, 51 percent, of sample households to
consume more housing than they would if given S in cash.
The conclusion is clear though unstated. For the sampled households, public
housing distorts consumption but increases it no more on the average than
would an unrestricted transfer. Whatever might be said on behalf of a program
that increased housing consumption of most families, little can be said for one
that capriciously distorts it. Some other form of housing assistance must be
better, and housing allowances spring to mind. While I agree with the conclu-
sion, I have serious qualms about the analysis.
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My comments fall into two categories. The first concerns the possibility of
bias in the point estimates Kraft and Olsen present. The second concerns the
standard error that surrounds those estimates.
1. The fraction of income households would freely spend on housing is crucial
to the analysis. This fraction is based on regressions using data for households
just prior to their admission to public housing. The proportion of the variance in
the housing income ratio explained by these regressions is remarkably low [one
R2 (adjusted) is negative, the others range from .14 to 26]. This means that most
of the variance in the housing-income ratio is due to other factors. The method
that Kraft and Olsen have used converts these unexplained variances into
estimates of distortion by public housing.
An example willillustrate the problem. Assume that we estimate the
rent-income ratio for a sample of households as a function of several variables,
exactly as Kraft and Olsen did, and that the regression explains, say, 20 percent
of the variance in the rent-income ratio. Assume now that this sample moves
into public housing and that each family consumes exactly the same amount of
housing as it would have consumed if it had been given Sin cash. By definition
there is no distortion in housing consumption; S = Tand Z = 0. Yet if we estimate
the distortion from the predicted rent-income ratio, in a manner analogous to
that used by Kraft and Olsen. we will conclude that 80 percent of the variation in
rent-income ratios is the result of distortion caused by public housing. This
problem vanishes only if the equation predicting the rent-income ratio has an A2
of 1 .0. and it is directly proportional to the amount by which R2 is less than 1 .0.
One must hold suspect calculations which are based on regressions that leave at
least three-quarters of the variation in the rent-income ratio unexplained, and
which, in effect, charge as distortions of public housing the difference between
the actual rent-income ratio and such an estimated value.
There are two other reasons why,Ithink, Kraft and Olsen overestimate
distortion. First, one would expect that families with above-average tastes for
housing would show positive residuals in the equation that estimates rent-
income ratios, and would be more likely than families with lower tastes to accept
public housing only ifit were better than average (and, of course, relatively
cheap). The reverse argument suggests that households with below-average
tastes for housing would differentially end up in lower-quality public housing
units. By ignoring both such assortative effects, Kraft and Olsen tend to
overestimate distortion.
But even if distortion is overestimated, any distortion is too much if public
housing does not cause more housing to be consumed than would an
unrestricted cash transfer. I think there is reason tosuspectthat Kraft and Olsen
underestimate the impact of public housing on housing consumption.
The rent-income ratio of households just before admission to public housing is
likely to be abnormally high. It is more likely that the current measured income of
such households is below rather than above normal income. Kraft and Olsen
acknowledge that using measured income may cause problems. In fact, they
understate the increase in housing consumption to the extent that the ratio of
housing consumption to current income exceeds the ratio of housing consump-
tion to normal income.
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Second, Kraft and Olsen use a convenient construct, developed, I think, by
Muth, that defines a unit of housing service as whatever $1 buys. It is a very
useful approach and I have used it, as has Olsen, in previous work. The rationale
for using this construct is that under conditions of equilibrium, the marginal utility
of $1 spent by the tenant on each feature of the house must be equal and must
equal the cost of providing it. Those of us who feel that the housing industry is
fairly competitive have no trouble accepting this assumption for aggregative
analysis. However, I think that it is unacceptable at the micro level.
Unless all households are in equilibrium all the time, the marginal value to
particular households of the various features of a housing unit may not equal the
market value of these features. Even if we are willing to apply hedonic indexes
estimated for market housing to public housing, there is no reason to think that
public-housing tenants value the particular bundle of features public housing
units contain in the same way as the market would. In other words, there is no
way of knowing whether a public-housing tenant, who if given S would have
spent exactly M on housing, would have chosen public housing—with its
peculiar set of features often unavailable in the free market—or market housing
if both had a market value of Mand rented for M. Once again, however, there is
some reason to think that households that cared less than average for the
features that public housing had in greatest supply would be less likely to end up
in public housing. Conversely, one would expect that households that liked the
features of public housing more than average would be more likely to end up in
public housing.
2.The estimates presented in the Kraft-Olsen paper are consistently
insignificant. Not only are the relationships between rent-income ratios very
loose (8 coefficients out of 14 are smaller than their standard errors), but, more
importantly, the estimates of the impact of public housing on consumption of
housing and of other goods and the estimates of the net tenant benefit are so
unreliable that one cannot reject any of the following hypotheses for particular
households at even unimpressive levels of significance:
1.that housing consumption doubles;
2.that housing consumption declines 50 percent;
3.that housing consumption goes up more than nonhousing consumption;
4.that housing consumption goes up less than nonhousing consumption; or
5.that net benefits of public housing are negative.
Having worried about the same questions Kraft and Olsen address in their
paper, and having gotten nowhere, I admire the ingenuity and the care that they
have demonstrated. Ialso have preconceptions about the desirability of sub-
sidies.tied to housing demand rather than to supply, which I know they share. I
look forward to evidence in support of our views that is free of the questionable
elements of the current paper. In the meantime, we should all be grateful for the
step forward that their effort represents.
The Distribution of Benefits from Public Housing 69